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SUMMARY
Anosognosia is a multi-factorial syndrome whose clinical
manifestations can vary considerably from patient to patient.
Considering the complexity of this syndrome, its assessment
represents a major challenge for the diagnostic process, and
presents various methodological complications. Lack of
agreement about diagnostic criteria, high exclusion rates of
specific patient categories, assessment limited to certain as-
pects of unawareness, and the lack of normative data and
methodologically robust tools may have led to contrasting, or
apparently contrasting, interpretations of this syndrome. De-
spite the apparently greater sensitivity of the last generation
of anosognosia studies to many of these issues, many as-
pects are still overlooked. In this manuscript, we critically re-
view the literature on the assessment of anosognosia, mainly
focusing on motor and language deficits, with a note on the
issue of awareness for memory deficits.
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Did he know this? Of course he did. He was a
physician, so he must know. But he was human,
so he could arrange many things for himself. Both
knowing and not knowing – one of the most fre-
quent human arrangements. 
Saul Bellow, Mr Sammler’s Planet, 1969
INTRODUCTION
Anosognosia is a multifarious syndrome, whose clinical manifestations can
vary considerably from patient to patient (see Prigatano, this issue). Patients
may acknowledge their deficit but appear unconcerned (anosodiaphoria; Babin-
ski, 1914), or deny their hemiplegia but agree to remain in the ward for treatment
(e.g., Marcel et al., 2004); yet even if severely paretic, they may attempt to per-
form tasks that usually require both limbs, such as walking (e.g. Bisiach & Gem-
iniani, 1991). Other patients acknowledge their deficit only if it is attributed to
third parties in the same condition (e.g. Marcel et al., 2004 for hemiplegia; Maher
et al., 1994 for aphasia), or partially admit their impairment though ascribing it to
causes other than their brain insult, such as arthritis. Others even manifest delu-
sions, such as denying that the paretic limb is their own (somatoparaphrenia;
e.g. Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). Moreover, anosognosia can be deficit-
specific; that is, some patients may deny their aphasia but acknowledge their
hemiplegia, or vice versa (e.g. Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1963 case 1; Breier et
al., 1995). Dissociations have been observed even within the same type of im-
pairment; for instance, patients may acknowledge the motor impairment of their
arm but deny the paresis of their leg, or vice versa (Berti et al., 1996; Bisiach et
al., 1986; Della Sala et al., 2009). Similarly, aphasic patients have been reported
who deny their spoken errors but concede their written ones (e.g. Marshall et
al., 1998 – case RMM).
ANOSOGNOSIA FOR MOTOR IMPAIRMENTS
The reported frequency of anosognosia following brain damage varies con-
siderably across studies, ranging from 7% to 77% (Orfei et al., 2007; see also
Jehkonen et al., 2006). This variability may be due to different diagnostic criteria
(Baier & Karnath, 2005) or to recruitment of patients at different post-onset in-
tervals. Indeed, while some studies (Cutting, 1978; Starkstein et al., 1992; Stone
et al., 1993; Baier & Karnath, 2005, 2008; Vocat et al., 2010) investigated the
presence of anosognosia in patients in the acute phase of their disease (i.e. less
than one month – Levine et al., 1991), other studies considered more heteroge-
neous groups of patients, including both acute and chronic patients (Nathanson
et al., 1952; Berti et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2004; Spalletta et al., 2007; Della
Sala et al., 2009; Cocchini et al., 2010a). 
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Anosognosia for motor impairment is usually considered to be a syndrome
that spontaneously resolves within a few weeks, and chronic anosognosia is
thought to be associated with general cognitive impairment (McGlynn & Schac-
ter, 1989; Levine, 1990; Levine, et al., 1991; Goldberg & Barr, 1991). However,
reviews of the literature have shown that chronic anosognosia is not as rare as
textbooks suggest (see Table 1 in Cocchini et al., 2002; Orfei et al., 2007; Jehko-
nen et al., 2006), and several studies have pointed out how lack of awareness
can seriously interfere with functional recovery and rehabilitation training (Gi-
alanella & Mattioli, 1992; Maeshima et al., 1997; Hartman-Maeir et al., 2001;
Hartman-Maeir et al., 2002; Appelros et al., 2002; Gialanella, et al., 2005; Di
Legge et al., 2005). 
It is possible that chronic anosognosia could have been underestimated be-
cause of the diagnostic tools; indeed, relatively little attention has been paid to
the assessment of anosognosia (for a critique see Jenkinson et al., 2011). Pri-
gatano (2010) has pointed out that questionnaires or structured interviews, often
used in anosognosia diagnosis, are only an indirect measure of awareness, and
that the method of comparing the patients’ self-evaluations on questionnaires to
those of their caregivers (Prigatano & Altman, 1990; Prigatano et al., 1997) is
flawed with methodological biases (see also Orfei et al., 2010a).
Marcel et al. (2004) observed that more anosognosic cases were reported
when questionnaires enquiring about specific bimanual and bipedal tasks were
used, rather than general interviews about motor impairments. We suggested
that patients in sub-acute or chronic phases may have been overexposed to
some of the more common questions used to assess anosognosia (Cocchini et
al., 2009). Thus, patients may have provided the “correct” response based on
what they had “learned” about themselves rather than on their actual awareness
of their deficit. Interestingly, we observed that the questions that best predicted
the presence of anosognosia in the less acute phases were those enquiring
about activities such as “washing dishes” or “opening bottles”, whereas the worst
predictors were questions about “walking” or “clapping hands”, both recurrent
questions in the classical assessments of anosognosia, such as the structured
interviews (Della Sala et al., 2009). 
A further problem is posed by patients showing only a mild or moderate motor
deficit. Nathanson et al. (1952) suggested that patients with mild paresis may
show anosognosia; however, since their response to questions such as “Can
you move your hand?” could be difficult to interpret, “the criterion of complete
paralysis was necessary” (p. 381). Structured interviews rely on the fact that the
patient is claiming to be able to move a paretic limb. However, some patients
may actually be able to perform partial movements, rendering the interpretation
of their answers ambiguous, especially if norms are not available. Moreover,
some patients might not report their motor impairment spontaneously, as this
may subjectively be considered less relevant than other ailments which afflict
them (Baier & Karnath, 2005); this would be particularly true in the case of mod-
erate or mild motor impairment. As a consequence, many authors have limited
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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recruitment for their studies to acute stroke patients presenting with complete
paresis (e.g. Baier & Karnath, 2008; Vocat et al., 2010). 
It is generally accepted that anosognosia for hemiplegia is caused by lesions
in the right hemisphere. However, most diagnostic measures rely heavily on the
patients’ verbal report. This is a clear limitation in studies attempting to assess
anosognosia in aphasic patients, and has led to high exclusion rates of left brain
damaged patients, and possible underestimation of anosognosia for right hemi-
plegia (e.g., Cutting, 1978; Morin et al., 2007; Cocchini et al., 2009). Studies
capi talising on the intra-carotid sodium amobarbital procedure (Wada test) did
show a higher frequency of anosognosia for left hemiplegia after anesthesia of
the right hemisphere; however, they also indicated that when the left hemisphere
was inactivated, the frequency of anosognosia for right hemiplegia varied greatly,
ranging from zero (Gilmore et al., 1992) to 86% (Durkin et al., 1994). It follows
that the apparent strong hemispheric asymmetry that has guided research and
theoretical interpretations may suffer from a methodological bias, and the left
hemisphere may play some role in awareness, even if probably less crucial than
or different from that of the right hemisphere. 
Awareness is a general term which encompasses different levels. Typical
questions in structural interviews are: “Are your hands equally strong?” or “Do
you have any problem in walking?”. Hence, this method may not be suitable to
assess less explicit manifestations of anosognosia. For example, Ramachandran
and Blakeslee (1998) described a patient severely anosognosic for his hemiple-
gia. However, during a conversation with the authors, the patient commented 
“I can’t wait to get back to two-fisted drinking” (p. 143). Another patient (CC) de-
scribed by Berti et al. (1998) showed a “backwards awareness” for a deficit which
was never directly acknowledged. When the examiner asked her how her left
hand was, CC stated: “it was very disobedient […] I wanted to lift it up…but it…
nothing!” (p. 31) despite claiming soon after that now her limb was fine and could
be lifted up without any problem. Investigation of this less explicit anosognosia
may reveal important information about awareness mechanisms and guide re-
habilitation training.
METHODS TO ASSESS ANOSOGNOSIA 
FOR MOTOR IMPAIRMENT
Explicit anosognosia
The assessment of anosognosia is usually based on meta-cognitive tasks,
where patients are asked to reflect upon their own condition and provide some
type of self-evaluation. This is what we will refer to as “explicit anosognosia”.
The most common diagnostic tools are structured interviews and self-evaluation
questionnaires (e.g., Jehkonen et al., 2006; Orfei et al., 2007, 2010a; also sum-
marised in Table 1). 
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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The structured interview
Interviews engage the patients in a more or less structured conversation in
order to understand whether they are aware of their deficit or if they can become
aware after demonstration of the impairment. The examiner often assigns a
score indicating the patient’s degree of awareness. Typically, these interviews
begin with general questions about the patient’s situation and then narrow down
to a specific deficit. If the patient denies his/her deficit, then they are “forced” to
face a demonstration (e.g. “Can you touch the examiner’s nose with your left
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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[paretic] hand?”; Bisiach et al., 1986, Berti et al., 1996). Responses to this ques-
tion can provide interesting information. For example, when Welman (1969)
asked his patient to lift the paretic hand, the patient replied “I’m not superman!”
while one of Ramachandran and Blakeslee’s (1998) patients (RM) uttered “Done”
despite the fact that her arm remained motionless. Both these patients showed
lack of awareness of their hemiplegia, but it is interesting to consider the patients’
differing reactions to the task. Welman’s patient acknowledged, to some extent,
that his hand did not move, whereas RM denied clear evidence that she could
not move her arm, suggesting that very different mechanisms might underlie
these patients’ anosognosia. For example, one of our own patients, NL, when
asked to lift his left (paretic) hand, kept raising his right unimpaired hand. NL’s
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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behavior supported the idea that his anosognosia might have been caused by
an associated disorder of body schema and personal neglect (Cocchini et al.,
2002). An attempt to consider different patients’ “reactions”, and not just lack of
awareness, can be found in Cutting et al.’s (1978) study, where the authors pro-
vided a classification of the patients’ responses to specific questions/situations,
identifying a set of “anosognosic phenomena”, which could be associated with a
general lack of awareness (see Table 2).
Self-evaluation of motor abilities
Another method often used to evaluate explicit anosognosia for motor impair-
ment consists in asking the patients to rate their ability to perform various every-
day tasks which require the use of both hands or legs, such as clapping hands
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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or walking (e.g. Berti et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2004; Della Sala et al., 2009).
The patient’s possible overestimation of their motor abilities, as contrasted with
a caregiver’s rating of their actual performance, is interpreted as evidence of
anosognosia. Compared to the structured interviews, this type of assessment
allows clinicians and researchers to better identify the various degrees of un-
awareness, and this method can also be used with patients with moderate motor
impairments. However, the patients are asked to “predict” what would be their
performance in specific situations. Moreover, this method relies heavily on the
patients’ verbal competency, which leads to high rates of exclusion of left-brain
damaged patients, resulting in underestimation of anosognosia following left-
brain damage. 
The recently developed VATAm (Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for
motor deficits – Della Sala et al., 2009) contains some innovations that allow for
a more reliable investigation of anosognosia in brain damaged patients in gene -
ral, and specifically in patients presenting with language impairments. In this
task, patients are asked to rate their own performance on a series of bimanual
and bipedal tasks. To account for possible verbal communication difficulties, each
question is illustrated by a drawing (see Figure 1a) and a 4-point visual-analogue
Likert scale facilitates the patients’ rating. Finally, the patient’s reliability is mon-
itored by means of 4 “check questions” requiring obvious answers regardless of
the impairment (e.g. ease in juggling five balls in the air -– see Figure 1b). Pa-
tients’ ratings are then compared with those of their caregivers, and normative
data allow the interpretation of possible discrepancies with cut-offs which identify
various degrees of anosognosia (i.e. mild, moderate and severe). This test has
recently been compared with the structured interview method in assessing
anosognosia in left-brain damaged patients showing various degree of motor im-
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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pairment (Cocchini et al., 2009). By means of the VATAm up to 70% of the left-
brain-damaged patients were reliably assessed, and 40% of them showed some
degree of anosognosia. By means of the structured interview, on the other hand,
only half of the patients could be assessed and of these only 10% were identified
as anosognosics. Interestingly, a high number of anosognosic patients diag-
nosed by means of the VATAm consisted of patients showing severe and mod-
erate, not mild, degrees of anosognosia. 
However, this test also relies partly on verbal competence, and the reliability of
the patients’ responses is indirectly inferred from check questions. Moreover, the
patients have different degrees of direct experience of the situations depicted. For
example, some may have already experienced difficulty in washing their hands but
not in washing dishes. Some authors have also pointed out some gender biases
in the patients’ responses that should be considered (Marcel et al., 2004). 
The role of the caregiver’s evaluation is also debatable. Despite some studies
showing that caregivers’ ratings reflect data from more objective measures of
the patient’s deficit (e.g. Fleming et al., 1996; Della Sala et al., 2009), caregivers
are offering a subjective evaluation, which may be affected by personal, as well
as medical, factors (Prigatano et al., 2005; Godfrey et al., 2003). Therefore, the
comparison with actual performance may be preferable (Berti et al., 1996; Marcel
et al., 2004).
Implicit awareness
Answers to questionnaires or structured interviews may not be the best in-
struments to reveal phenomenological experience (Prigatano, 2010). There may
be some discrepancy between what is acknowledged verbally and what is less
consciously believed by the patient, yet responsible for their actual behavior.
House and Hodges (1988) described an anosognosic patient who, amongst 
a series of pictures of people, identified those on a wheelchair as most similar to
her. These observations suggest that some knowledge about the deficit can be
processed without reaching consciousness, and may become apparent only in
the patient’s behavior, conversation or responses to indirect questions. 
Several recent studies have attempted to address implicit processing in
anosognosia with novel methods that allow for a systematic investigation (see
Table 1). Marcel et al. (2004) developed the “1st- and 3rd -person estimates task”
whereby patients are asked to rate their own ability in performing a specific bi-
manual or bipedal task and then to rate the same ability by somebody in the
same condition (see also Berti et al., 1996). Under these conditions, some
anosognosic patients rated the ability of the other person significantly lower than
their own. Nardone et al. (2007; see also Fotoupoulou et al., 2010) reported fur-
ther evidence for implicit awareness in anosognosic patients. By means of the
Dot probe paradigm, whereby patients are asked to perform a speedy decision
task about the color of a target, these authors observed that anosognosic pa-
tients showed longer latencies than aware patients if a word related to a motor
tasks (e.g. walking) was displayed simultaneously with the target. No significant
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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differences were observed between the two groups if the word was not related
to a motor task (e.g. reading) (Figure 2). The authors suggested that longer la-
tencies by anosognosic patients in association with motor words reflected a de-
nial process triggered by the presence of threatening information.
Inspired by Ramachandran and Blakeslee’s (1998) work, we have recently
developed the Behavioural Motor Task (BMT – Cocchini et al., 2010a), which as-
sesses anosognosia considering the patient’s actual behavior while performing
simple bimanual motor tasks. Although these tasks are usually performed better
using both hands (e.g. holding a two-handle tray placing one hand at each ex-
tremity), they can also be performed using only one hand if the motor action is
re-organized (“aware strategy” – e.g. placing the unimpaired hand underneath
the tray, at the center). We observed that about a quarter of our sample (i.e., 7
out of 30; 23%) did not adopt “aware strategies.” Interestingly, some of them
started to adopt aware strategies when asked to perform the same tasks a sec-
ond time (empirical learning). Despite the fact that this benefit was transient for
several of them, these findings suggest that a process of empirical learning may
not only modify the patient’s verbal evaluations, as reported by Marcel et al.
(2004) and by Berti et al. (1996; cases CF and CG), but also the patient’s be-
havior. This change of awareness after actual performance is intriguing, as it
suggests that in some cases unawareness may be due to lack of information, or
to difficulty in understanding the feedback, about their motor impairment. 
Double dissociations between implicit and explicit anosognosia, reported in
some studies (e.g. Marcel et al., 2004), imply that different mechanisms might
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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be responsible for different types of anosognosia. Limiting the assessment to
one aspect, the more explicit one, may have led clinicians and researchers to
overlook other forms of anosognosia. Less explicit information can be crucial to
better account for anosognosia, as it suggests a possible contribution of motiva-
tional and psychological mechanisms in anosognosia (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955;
Weinstein, 1991; Turnbull & Solms, 2007; Nardone et al., 2007). One direct im-
plication of these accounts is that patients should possess information about
their motor deficit for a denial mechanism to be triggered, but this information
may have not reached full consciousness. Marcel et al.’s (2004) “1st- and 3rd -
person estimates task” could be easily adopted in clinical settings, but it still relies
to some extent on explicit and verbal report. On the other hand, the BMT is not
suitable for patients showing mild motor impairments, as they may still be able
to perform the task, although clumsily. 
ANOSOGNOSIA FOR LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENT
Aphasics show anosognosia for various aspects of their language difficulties,
including comprehension, production and even pragmatics (i.e., ability to respect
the rules of effective communication; Kertesz et al., 2010; see also Rubens &
Garrett, 1991; Vuilleumier, 2000; Adair et al., 2003; Kertesz, 2010). Lack of
awareness of language impairment has been considered a key feature of jargon
aphasia, to such an extent that this type of aphasia has been defined as “a mix-
ture of aphasia and anosognosia” (Weinstein et al., 1966; p. 187). Anosognosia
for aphasia has been associated with bilateral lesions (e.g., Weinstein et al.,
1966; Ruben & Garett, 1991) suggesting a crucial role of the right hemisphere
also in the denial of language disorders. However, lack of awareness of aphasia
has been observed also in patients whose lesion was confined to the left hemi-
sphere (Kertesz & Benson, 1970; Gainotti, 1972; Cocchini et al., 2010b; Cocchini
et al., submitted). Within this framework, it has been suggested that anosognosia
for aphasia results from a lack of comprehension or disturbed feedback of one’s
own speech (e.g. Leburn, 1987). Gainotti (1972) investigated anosognosia in a
group of 19 non-fluent, 16 fluent and 24 amnesic aphasic patients. He found that
only 4 fluent aphasics appeared unaware of their language deficits. Therefore, the
association of unawareness with jargon and sensory aphasia, and the fact that
monitoring relies on intact comprehension, has led researchers to maintain that
poor comprehension would prevent accurate monitoring and discovery of the deficit
(e.g., Boller et al., 1978; Wernicke, 1874; Heilman, 1991). Other studies, however,
reported that some anosognosic patients could recognise their own speech errors
when listening to their recorded performance (Shuren et al., 1995; Marshall et al.,
1998) or if the errors were attributed to other persons (Alajouanine, 1956; Kins-
bourne & Warrington, 1963; Maher et al., 1994), suggesting other possible causes
for anosognosia than a comprehension deficit. 
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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METHODS TO ASSESS ANOSOGNOSIA 
FOR LANGUAGE DISORDERS 
The assessment of anosognosia for language deficits is particularly complex
due to the difficulty in interpreting aphasics’ responses to questions related to
their deficits. In this context, information about the patient’s explicit self-evalua-
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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tion, so relevant for anosognosia for motor impairment, is rarely considered (e.g.
Breier et al., 1995; see also Kertesz’s 2010) or is reported anecdotally (e.g. Kins-
bourne & Warrington, 1963; Kertesz 2010). The difficulty in engaging patients
with language difficulties in relatively complex conversations about their deficits
and the risk of collecting unreliable data, have led clinicians and researchers to
explore alternative methods of assessing anosognosia for aphasia either by
means of clinical scales or by indirect methods, such as the evaluation of the
patients’ self-corrections (See Table 3). 
Clinical scales devised to assess lack of awareness in patients presenting
with language difficulties are mainly based on clinicians’ evaluations (e.g. Kertesz
et al., 2000). Some of these scales contain several questions related to various
deficits (e.g., apathy, inhibition) together with questions enquiring about the pa-
tients’ insight into their language deficit (e.g. “Is s/he aware of any problems or
changes in behavior, or does s/he seem unaware of them or deny them when
discussed?”; Kertesz et al., 1997). 
EXPLICIT ANOSOGNOSIA
The patients’ explicit knowledge of their own language deficits can currently
only be assessed by means of crude and over-simplified questions, hence the
“development of methods for investigating unawareness in different aphasic
groups is clearly necessary” (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; p. 180).
Error detection method
The error detection method (Marshall et al., 1998) has been used in several
studies to assess explicit awareness of aphasia (see Table 3). Patients are typ-
ically asked to detect their errors during the description of a complex scene or
during a naming task (e.g. Alajouanine, 1956; Gainotti, 1972; Maher et al., 1994;
Marshall et al., 1998).
The ability to detect errors implies a flawless monitoring process, which re-
quires a correct analysis of feedback information (Boller et al., 1978; Peuser &
Temp, 1981). However, comprehension or feedback disorders per se may not
be the only cause of monitoring failures. Failures in error detection may result
from various causes, including the patients’ inability to accurately compare the
actual with the intended output (Marshall et al., 1998). In line with this hypothesis,
some studies (Shuren et al., 1995; Marshall et al., 1998; Maher et al., 1994) have
reported on patients whose detection of speech errors was better when they
were asked to listen to their own previously tape-recorded performance (off-line
condition), than they did while speaking (on-line condition). In particular, Maher
et al. (1994) systematically investigated error detection ability in one aphasic pa-
tient (case AS) during on-line and off-line conditions. AS recognized only about
25% of his own errors in the on-line condition, but he identified as many as 65%
of his errors in the off-line condition. Maher et al. (1994) interpreted the different
performance in the two conditions as a reduced attentional capacity that would
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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compromise the patient’s ability to speak and monitor simultaneously (see also
Lebrun, 1987; Shuren et al., 1995; Oomen & Postma, 2002). This type of inter-
pretation implies that the monitoring process is not directly linked to the language
deficit per se, as it would be in the case of a lack of comprehension of one’s own
speaking errors. Also Nozari et al. (2011) reported poor correlation between error
detection and comprehension, and they suggested that speech error detection
may depend mainly on production, rather than comprehension, processes. 
Further analyses of types of errors have provided interesting data. Some jar-
gon aphasics may acknowledge their oral and written mistakes only when these
are believed to be another person’s errors (Alajouanine, 1956; Kinsbourne &
Warrington, 1963; Maher et al., 1994). Maher et al.’s (1994) patient AS was
asked to listen to a tape-recorded examiner’s performance and to detect possible
errors. The errors were the same as those previously committed by the patient.
AS identified a higher percentage (88%) of the “examiner’s errors” than of his
own recorded errors (i.e. 65%), suggesting a higher sensitivity in detecting others’
errors than their own. Maher et al. (1994) did not exclude the possibility that in
addition to a reduced attentional capacity, AS’s unawareness of speech errors
could also be caused by adaptive denial mechanisms. Successful monitoring of
speech depends on a number of intact processes, while “a deficit in any of these
mechanisms may be sufficient to cause anosognosia for aphasia” (Maher et al.,
1994; p. 415). Therefore, as for anosognosia for motor impairment, anosognosia
for aphasia should also be considered a multi-factorial phenomenon, which may
require different diagnostic tools tapping different aspects of awareness.
Self-rating method
To our knowledge the VATA-L (Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for Lan-
guage Disorders – Cocchini et al., 2010b) is the only method that attempts to
assess anosognosia for aphasia requiring self-rating of language impairments
(see Table 3). The VATA-L format is very similar to the VATAm previously de-
scribed. It consists of a series of questions about the patients’ ability to perform
common verbal tasks requiring language production and comprehension deficits.
Drawings illustrate each question to facilitate comprehension (see Figure 3a),
the visual-analogue Likert scale facilitates the patient’s rating task, response re-
liability is monitored by means of check questions (see Figure 3b), and normative
data allow interpretation of possible rating discrepancy (index of anosognosia)
between patients and caregivers. Our recent study showed that most of the
aphasics manage to reliably complete the test and that 20% of them showed
pathological underestimation of their language deficits (i.e. anosognosia for
aphasia). Interestingly, when language performance on comprehension and pro-
duction tasks is compared with anosognosia sub-scales for related language dis-
orders, we observed that unaware patients performed significantly worse on
production than comprehension sections of the language test (see Figure 4),
questioning, as seen in the discussion of the Error detection method, the role of
verbal production in awareness.
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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VATA-L shares the same main innovations: i) non-verbal communication is
encouraged and facilitated; ii) check questions allow one to exclude potentially
unreliable responses; iii) normative data allow us to extend assessment of
anosognosia to patients with various degrees and types of verbal impairment.
IMPLICIT/INDIRECT METHODS
The self-correction method
Some aphasics do not self-correct their speech errors. These patients may
hold conversations with little, if any, attempt to repair their mistakes, so that their
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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Figure 3. Examples of questions and illustrations from the VATA-L. Redrawn from Cocchini et al.,
2010b
Figure 4. Performance of patients (percentage of correct responses) showing anosognosia for pro-
duction and comprehension language deficits. Redrawn from Cocchini et al., 2010b
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communication is largely incomprehensible (e.g. Alajouanine, 1956; Kinsbourne
& Warrington, 1963; Weinstein et al., 1966; Levelt, 1983; Marshall et al., 1985;
Maher et al., 1994; Wernicke, 1874). Self-correction mechanisms may be inten-
tional, but they may also occur under less conscious control than, for example,
error detection; for this reason we labelled this method as an “implicit/indirect
method” (see Table 3).
The basic assumption of the self-correction method is that the rate of self-
corrections should reflect awareness of speaking errors: if aphasics are not
aware of their language errors, they will not attempt to correct them. Hence, lack
of self-corrections has been considered as evidence of anosognosia for lan-
guage impairments (e.g. Rubens & Garrett, 1991; Adair et al., 2003; Kertsez,
2010 for a review). However, while self-corrections clearly indicate some type of
awareness of an error, lack of corrections does not necessarily imply its unaware-
ness. Marshall and Tompkins (1982) pointed out the importance of considering
as index of awareness only successful self-corrections (i.e. the speaking error
is correctly amended). Therefore, the method of self-corrections has recently
been focused on the types of self-correction carried out rather than assessing
whether or not they occurred. In particular, recent studies have carried out de-
tailed analyses of healthy volunteers’ speech, underlining that self-corrections
may occur even before production and potential errors can be “detected” and
“corrected” before they reach the post-articulatory phase (Laver, 1980; Oomen
et al., 2001). Accordingly, Hofmann and Cohen (1979) noticed that aphasics
showed latencies preceding an error and there were self-corrections of different
natures, implying different mechanisms. Schlenck et al. (1987; see also Buck-
ingham & Kertesz, 1974; Butterworth, 1979; Keller, 1979) proposed a classifica-
tion of self-corrections encompassing “repairs”, defined as attempts to correct
errors which just occurred, and “prepairs”, which consist of various searching
behaviors (such as pauses) that are not preceded by an error. This distinction is
relevant, as these two types of self-correction seem to act as indexes of good
functioning of post-articulatory and pre-articulatory monitoring systems, respec-
tively. Interestingly, repairs are far less frequent than prepairs, and clearly their
scoring is more complex. 
ANOSOGNOSIA FOR OTHER DEFICITS
Some of the causes of anosognosia may be deficit-specific; for example, lack
of verbal comprehension may account for anosognosia for aphasia (Lebrun,
1987), personal neglect may prevent patients from becoming aware of hemiple-
gia (Cocchini et al., 2002) and, similarly, memory impairment could per se pre-
vent patients from remembering their memory failures, resulting in a lack of
awareness of their amnesia (Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007). Accordingly, we would
expect to observe the phenomenon of anosognosia limited to a specific deficit
and not extending to other possible associated deficits. However, findings in the
literature and various theories (e.g. McGlynn & Schacher, 1989; Levine, 1990;
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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Weinstein, 1991; Turnbull & Solms, 2007; Marshall et al., 1998; Maher et al.,
1994) suggest that common mechanisms (e.g. monitoring deficits or motivational
denial) may be responsible for unawareness of various deficits. For example,
outcomes of studies on anosognosia for language disorders (e.g., Marshall et
al., 1998), suggested interesting overlaps with possible interpretations of anosog-
nosia for motor impairments, and some theoretical models do not exclude shared
mechanisms for awareness of different deficits (e.g. Levine, 1990; McGlynn &
Schacter, 1989; Weinstein, 1991). Therefore, investigating anosognosia for all
the patient’s deficits would provide important insights into the deficit-specific or
shared mechanisms underlying lack of awareness (Davies et al., 2005). How-
ever, anosognosia for different deficits is usually assessed with very different
methods, and this has led to a partial segregation of the literature according to
the deficit denied or the type of syndrome shown by the patient, making it difficult
to explore anosognosia across different domains and deficits. 
An important anosognosia is that for one’s own memory impairment. This
has been often investigated in patients in early stages of Alzheimer’s Disease –
AD (for a recent review see Kaszniak & Edmonds, 2010). The results indicate
that over 40% of AD patients show anosognosia for their amnesia (Orfei et al.,
2010b) and its presence is associated with decreased functional activation of
medial prefrontal and anterior temporal areas (Zamboni et al., in press). Lack of
awareness of memory deficits in dementia has also been sketched in cognitive
models. For instance, Hannesdottir and Morris (2007; See also Agnew & Morris,
1998) distinguished between a form of anosognosia secondary to memory or
executive dysfunction, and primary anosognosia, which affects the system of
self-awareness directly. 
Less is known about anosognosia for memory deficits in patients with focal
brain lesions, and our knowledge is mainly anecdotal or derived from observa-
tions of single cases (Schacter et al., 1990). However, several authors have
pointed out that lack of awareness of memory impairment is a common occur-
rence also in patients suffering from traumatic brain injury (TBI - Prigatano et al.,
1990; Sherer et al., 1998; Bach & David, 2006; Trahan et al., 2006; Malec et al.,
2007; Sherer et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2009; see also Prigatano, this issue). Tinson
and Lincoln (1987) maintained that unawareness of memory problems is fre-
quent also in stroke patients; similarly, Wilson et al. (2008) pointed out that these
patients often show lack of insight. Usually, assessment of anosognosia for am-
nesia in focal patients is based on questionnaires consisting in a series of ques-
tions about various possible deficits, including amnesia (e.g., the Patient
Competency Rating Scale - Prigatano et al., 1986; the Awareness Questionnaire
– Sherer et al., 1998). These represent a valuable approach to evaluate lack of
awareness across different deficits, but they are clearly limited to the most evi-
dent aspects of memory deficits. 
Some authors have observed that prospective, rather than retrospective,
memory difficulties may be more relevant in everyday life (Smith et al., 2000;
Maylor et al., 2002; Salthouse et al., 2004) and that patients may have different
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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degrees of awareness for different types of amnesia (Baddeley, 1990). Smith et
al. (2000) devised the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire
(PRMQ), which consists of sixteen questions, eight enquiring about prospective,
and eight about retrospective memory failures. Participants are asked to rate
how often, from 1 (never) to 5 (very often), they would experience memory fail-
ures. Patients’ ratings are then compared with proxy-ratings (i.e. ratings of care-
givers evaluating the patients’ memory ability) and discrepancies higher than the
cut-off derived from norms are considered abnormal (Crawford et al., 2003;
Crawford et al., 2006); therefore, such discrepancies can be considered as an
index of anosognosia. 
Using the PRMQ, we have investigated (unpublished study) awareness for
memory deficits in a group of 26 (18 males and 8 females) brain damaged pa-
tients (17 stroke, 7 TBI and 2 anoxic patients), diagnosed as global amnesiacs
by means of a comprehensive neuropsychological test battery. Their mean age
and education were 56.23 years (sd= 15.22) and 11.53 years (sd= 4.26), respec-
tively. We found that 20 out of 26 (77%) of these amnesic patients had a dis-
crepancy score well above the cut-off indicated by Crawford et al. (2006), thus
showing some lack of awareness of their amnesia (see Figure 5), but we did not
find a significant difference in awareness between prospective and retrospective
amnesia. In this sample the severity of amnesia, as assessed by means of the
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT-3; Wilson et al., 2008) correlated
positively with the degree of anosognosia (r= .40 ; p<.05). This finding is in line
with one of the three types of anosognosia for amnesia identified by Agnew and
Morris (1998) as mnemonic anosognosia. According to these authors, mnemonic
anosognosia would be directly caused by amnesia per se, which would prevent
a correct updating of the patient’s semantic personal knowledge with information
about memory failures. It would be therefore interesting to challenge this diag-
nosis by exploring whether similar patients would show anosognosia for other
possible deficits and, if so, by considering other explanations that may contem-
plate a common mechanism, such as an impairment of the Conscious Aware-
ness System (CAS), also identified by Hannesdottir and Morris as primary
anosognosia (see also Agnew & Morris, 1998).
Assessment of anosognosia across different deficits with comparable meas-
ures should be encouraged. Some studies (e.g. Marcel et al., 2004) have at-
tempted to investigate various levels of awareness for more than one deficit in
the same clinical sample. In response to this necessity, we are also validating a
new measure to assess anosognosia for amnesia (the VATAmem: Visual-Ana-
logue Test for Anosognosia for memory impairment; still unpublished). The for-
mat, procedures and basic methodology of this new tool are very similar to those
of the VATAm and VATA-L described above. The VATAmem consists of a series
of questions enquiring about different aspects of memory (prospective and ret-
rospective, in particular). Vignettes (see Figure 6) illustrate each question, not
only to facilitate comprehension in general, but also to support memory, as wordy
questions themselves can tax memory. Check questions ensure reliability and
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normative data allow interpretation of possible patient-caregiver discrepancies. 
These features should facilitate the assessment of anosognosia for memory
impairment in large clinical populations with various degrees of amnesia. It
should then be possible to reliably assess explicit awareness for three different
deficits by means of very similar methods, facilitating comparison of findings and
providing insight about the underlying mechanisms.
CONCLUSIONS
The complexity of anosognosia represents an evident challenge for its as-
sessment, which presents with various methodological hurdles (e.g. Prigatano,
Cocchini et al., Assessing anosognosia
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Figure 6. Examples of questions and vignettes from the VATAmem test
Figure 5. Patient-caregiver discrepancy values and overall mean of 26 amnesic patients. Discre-
pancy is calculated using true scores. Horizontal line indicates the cut-off score of 7 (Crawford et
al., 2006)
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2010). Lack of consensus amongst researchers and clinicians about the methods
of assessment results in difficulties in comparing findings across different studies
(Vuilleumier, 2000; 2004; Adair et al., 2003; Baier & Karnath, 2005; Jehkonen et
al., 2006; Vallar & Ronchi, 2006; Orfei et al., 2007; Jenkinson et al., 2011), and
it may have produced contrasting findings (Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010). It
seems indeed likely that while similar mechanisms may underlie anosognosia
for different deficits, different causes may determine anosognosia for a specific
deficit. Hence, on one hand, anosognosia studies should explore different as-
pects and levels of awareness for a specific deficit to better characterize the pos-
sible reasons for lack of awareness. On the other hand, it is important to extend
the investigation to awareness to the gamut of deficits shown by the patient. 
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